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In this paper we rely on the  literature  on  R&D-based  growth  models in order to 
examine the patterns of development in national innovative capacity. Focusing on the country level 
investments in R&D, and in the examination of the patent counts, in a broad sample of countries that 
include the leaders and the followers in catching up to the world's leading countries, we put 
forth  three  main  conclusions  that  could  be  extensive  to  the  growth  of  sub-national 
regions: i) the most successful economies are those where increases in aggregate R&D 
efforts are induced by the action of the business sector; ii) the R&D efforts must go 
hand by hand with concerns of efficiency; iii) high growth rates of patents are closely 




















It is well known that researchers in several traditions have argued that innovation 
is essential to ensure countries’ economic growth (Schumpeter, 1912; Freeman, 1987; 
Pavitt,  1982;  Romer,  1990;  Jones,  1995).  At  the  same  time,  other  researchers  have 
stressed  the  role  of  imitative  capacity  in  economic  catching-up  (Abramovitz,  1986; 
Fagerberg,  1987).  Simultaneously, for a  great  lot  of  countries economic growth has 
become one of the most significant policy commitments. Accordingly, though with very 
different  results,  several  countries  have  vastly  increased  their  economic  and  policy 
commitments to innovation and have made investments in their innovative capacity, and 
in their levels of R&D expenditures. 
As a matter of fact, theoretical and empirical literature shows that investments in 
R&D are important for economic growth. In the theoretical front, a great deal of models 
(Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992, to name only the 
most quoted) have illustrated the function of R&D as a growth engine, and demonstrated the 
reason why governments must have a role in achieving an optimum level of R&D. In the 
empirical front, several authors also show the importance of R&D returns. For example, in his 
survey about R&D spillovers, Griliches (1992) reports a wide range of estimates for the 
social return of R&D, with values that cluster in the range of 20 to 60 per cent, making 
R&D a major source of growth, accounting for at least half of all increases in per capita 
output. Additionally, Jones and Williams (1998) found that optimal R&D investment is 
at least four times greater than actual spending. 
The  activity  of  research  and  development  is  an  important  issue  in  the  recent 
endogenous growth literature. The models included in this R&D-based growth literature 
(Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; and Aghion and Howitt (1992) though 
differing from each other in important ways, all share the idea that entrepreneurs conduct 
R&D to gain monopoly power made possible by patents and other intellectual property rights. In 
these models technological change occurs due to deliberate and costly investments carried out 
by firms that intend to profit from monopoly power that results from successful innovation, and so 
increases in economically useful knowledge must imply an increase in the efforts made by firms 
in financing and performing R&D.    3
In  R&D-based  endogenous  growth  models  there  are  two  widely  used  strands:  the 
varieties model, which builds on foundations placed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Ethier 
(1982), and Romer (1990), and the quality ladders model developed by Aghion and Howitt 
(1992), and Grossman and Helpman (1991). In a closed economy, growth is sustained in the 
varieties  model  through  the  assumption  that  the  creation  of  new  products  expands  the 
knowledge  stock,  which  then  diminishes  the  cost  of  innovation.  As  more  products  are 
invented, both the costs of inventing new products and the profits of subsequent innovators are 
lower because of increased competition, since no products disappear from the market in this 
model.  
By contrast, the quality ladders model assumes that consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for higher-quality products. As a result, firms always have an incentive to improve 
the quality of products. The important assumption that sustains growth in both models is that 
every successful innovation allows all firms to study the attributes of the newly invented 
product and then improve on it. Patent rights restrict a firm from producing a product invented 
by some other firm but not from using the knowledge (created due to R&D) that is embodied in 
that product. Thus, as soon as a product is created, the knowledge needed for its production 
becomes available to all; such knowledge spillovers ensure that anyone can try to invent a 
higher-quality  version  of  the  same  product
1.  However,  we  must  insist  on  the  idea  that 
instantaneous knowledge spillovers only exist if firms use patents as a mode of protection. If 
firms use other forms of protection, like secret, the immediate availability of knowledge 
doesn’t  exist.  So,  from  the  endogenous  growth  perspective  the  R&D  performed  by 
business sector in percent of GDP (BERD/GDP) can show the commitment of firms to 
conduct R&D to gain monopoly power. 
Furthermore,  R&D  intensity,  the  structure  of  R&D  expenditures  and  the 
productivity of R&D outlays show a remarkable diversity across countries. Our paper 
uses this diversity and the lessons of the past three decades to shed some light on the 
relationship  between  productivity  and  technological  change,  and  aims  to  answer the 
following questions: How was the productivity in economic miracles propelled by a 
technological  change?  What  are  the  reasons  why  it  seems  so  easy  for  some  few 
countries  —  and  so  difficult  for  a  lot  of  others  —  to  catch-up  with  the  levels  of 
productivity of the world technological frontier? 
                                                 
1 From this viewpoint applied research and experimental development are the most important forms of using 
R&D for promoting wellbeing and sustaining growth.   4
So, in this paper we investigate the patterns of development in national innovative 
capacity, focusing on the country level investments in R&D, and in the examination of 
the  patent  counts,  in  a  broad  sample  of  countries  that  includes  the  leaders  and  the 
followers in catching up to the world's leading countries.  
The remainder  of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 aims to search 
patterns for R&D intensity and the structure of R&D expenditures; section 3 analyses 
patent  counts;  Section  4  relates  BERD  with  patent  counts  in  a  selected  group  of 
countries; Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Patterns of R&D intensity 
 
It  is  well  known  that  theoretically  not  all  the  activities  of  research  and 
experimental development are reported in statistics. There are many informal actions 
performed in firms, which in spite of being effectively R&D, escape computation in 
statistics. However, we need to use figures and the figures we use in this paper come 
from statistical databases. With these considerations in mind, let’s begin by analysing 
the Gross Domestic Expenditure on Research and Experimental Development (GERD) 
in a sample of 35 countries
2. As it is usually recognized there is a positive association 
between the level of development measured by GDP per capita and the intensity in 
efforts of R&D, measured by GERD as a % of GDP (GERD/GDP). Figure 1 illustrates 
such an association. 
The  figure  shows  considerable  dispersion  of  both  GERD/GDP  and  GDP  per 
capita, but the dispersion of technological efforts is higher than the dispersion of levels 
of development, as measured, for instance, by the respective standard deviation (SD) of 
the sample. For the 35 countries depicted in figure 1, the SD of log GDP pc (per capita) 
measured as per cent of US GDP pc is 0.23 while the SD of GERD/GDP is 0.28. If 
investments  in R&D are  a  key  component  of  economic growth and have very high 
returns, as was shown above, the higher dispersion of R&D efforts across-countries may 
have an effect on the catching-up process. 
 
 
                                                 
2 The sample is compound by countries that reported data on R&D included in the OECD database (see 
OECD, 2005).    5
 
Figure 1 

















Source: Based on data from OECD (2005) and World Bank (2005). 
 
As is apparent from figure 1 the relationship between the two variables is likely 
not to be linear indicating that as one country moves towards the technological frontier 
the “advantages of backwardness”, as mentioned in the “technological catch-up theory” 
(Gershenkron, 1962; Abramovitz, 1979, 1986; Maddison, 1987) are getting lower and 
lower. The decrease of those “advantages of backwardness” as the level of development 
increases  makes  mandatory  that  in  order  to  grow  countries  must  create  inside  their 
boundaries new knowledge through R&D activity. 
The cross-section depicted in figure 1 provides a static picture of the statistical 
relationship between level of development and intensity in efforts of R&D. But, how 
does  GERD/GDP  evolve  along  time?  The  analysis  of  the  longitudinal  trend  of 
GERD/GDP  can  illustrate  an  important  point:  there  is  a  much  more  variability  in 
GERD/GDP across-countries than along time in the same country. We interpret this 
finding  as  evidence  that  there  are  important  national  factors  influencing  GERD 
behaviour.  
Among countries that present data from 1981 there are three different patterns of 
evolution. Some countries (which we label as the technological leaders in 1981) began 
with a GERD/GDP percentage above the OECD average and have kept this position. 
The exception is the United Kingdom (while OECD average have been increased, UK 
has decreased its percentage). Of course, the behaviour of the other leaders was not 
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uniform.  Some  of  them  have  augmented  its  percentage  (with  Sweden  ahead)  while 
France ends the period with a similar position to the initial one (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2.  
















Source: Based on data from OECD (2005). 
 
As is apparent in figure 2, this group of countries ends the period of comparison 
with a dispersion of R&D efforts significantly higher than at the beginning of 1980s. 
A second, and more numerous, group of countries (the laggard followers) began 
the  1980-decade  with  a  GERD/GDP  percentage  lower  than  the  equivalent  OECD 
average, and remain at present without filling the gap (figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. 







































































































































































































Again, there is a diversity of performance, which enables us to make a distinction 
between  two  clusters:  the  four  countries  that  were  nearer  OECD  average  at  the 
beginning of 1980-decade do remain nearer, and the six laggards keep their position 
well below the OECD average. This latter group of countries, having started well below 
the OECD average, have timidly increased their percentage, apparently converging to a 
point that is situated below the OECD average. 
A third group of countries (the succeefull technological catchers) began the 1980-
decade with a GERD/GDP percentage lower than the OECD average but have increased 
their  R&D  efforts  and  are  successful  in  overcoming  the  gap.  The  most  spectacular 
performance in this group has occurred with Finland and Iceland. Two other countries, 
Taiwan and South Korea not included in figure 4 due to paucity of data, have a similar 
performance in terms of GERD/GDP. 
 
Figure 4 











Source: Based on data from OECD (2005). 
 
Even though GERD/GDP may be a good indicator of society’s commitment to 
R&D, it is also a very opaque indicator. First, GERD, being a very aggregative category 
overlooks significant details about the agents that perform the R&D activity, about the 
source of funds and more importantly about the adequacy of the mechanisms used to 
boost  the  R&D  intensity.  Inside  GERD  there  are  different  types  of  R&D:  applied 
research  and  experimental  development  (i.e.  product-related  research)  usually  mostly 
performed by the business sector; fundamental (i.e., basic) research most funded by 




































































Although much governmental R&D is for specific government needs, government 
funding is crucial to economic growth because market failures induce firms, which act 
in their own best interests, to underinvest in R&D from society’s perspective. However, 
if the government cannot identify the exact amount of spillovers, governmental funding 
as a form of solving market failures in R&D is much more likely to lead to inefficiency, 
and an increase in GERD/GDP can lead to a higher waste of resources and not to an 
enforcement of the technological capacity. Because there is a close association between 
industry-financed GERD and GERD/GDP (figure 5), an increase in the GERD/GDP 
ratio  can  be  the  simple  result  of  an  increase  in  industry-financed  GERD,  and  a 
significant percentage of GERD financed by business sector is of course an important 
indicator of the commitment of firms in the benefits of R&D.  
 
Figure 5 














Source: Based on data from OECD (2005). 
 
As it is apparent from figure 5, there is a positive correlation between industry 
financed GERD as a % of GDP and GERD/GDP. But there are also some dissonant 
patterns. Respecting the share of GERD financed by industry, there are some countries 
that push up the OECD average while others contribute to its decrease. In the group of 
the  former  technological  leaders,  Sweden  and Japan had  pushed  the increase of the 
OECD average of the industry-financed GERD, while France and the UK had shown 
the opposite behaviour (see figure A1, in Appendix). 
In the 5 countries that have successfully filled the GERD gap (with the exception 
of Austria and Belgium whose performance follow the evolution of OECD average) 
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there was a substantial increase in industry-financed GERD as a percentage of GDP, as 
it is apparent from figure A2 in Appendix. Among the countries of this group, the most 
notable performance came from Finland. 
Contrasting with the performance of these countries, the GERD laggards (i. e., 
the follower countries that fail in filling the GERD gap) do not show a sustainable 
convergence  to  the  OECD  average  in  industry-financed  GERD  (figure  A3,  in 
Appendix).  The  increase  in  the  percentage  of  GERD  financed  by  industry  in  the 
Netherlands was reversed in the middle of 1980’s and the corresponding Irish boost was 
finished in the middle of the 1990s. 
The analysis made till now shows that the successful catching-up in GERD is 
associated to an increase of the industry-financed GERD. This is not an astonishing fact 
because the increase in industry-financed GERD shows that the business sector sees in 
R&D  outlays  a  profitable  investment.  Accordingly,  an  increasing  share  of  business 
funds directed to R&D shows that a structural change is occurring: the transformation 
from an economy based on fixed capital to a more knowledge-oriented economy.  
On the other hand, the sector where R&D is carried out must be also considered 
because there is a positive correlation between BERD/GDP and GERD/GDP (figure 6). 
As  expected,  likely  because  there  are  governmental  financial  inducements,  this 
correlation  is  higher  than  the  correlation  between  industry-financed  GERD  and 
GERD/GDP (0.98 vs 0.96, respectively).  
 
Figure 6 














Source: Based on data from OECD (2005). 
 
























Nevertheless,  the  association  between  BERD/GERD  and  GERD/GDP  as 
depicted in figure 6 shows that there is more dispersion for low levels of GERD/GDP, 
than for higher levels. This differential dispersion is indicative of the disparity in the 
capacity  in  introducing  the  R&D  activities  in  the  routines  of  the  business  sector. 
Although this lack of capacity would bee experienced by a significant lot of economies 
it is usually more present in the ones with lower GDP per capita.  
The analysis of BERD by groups of countries shows a picture that essentially is 
not  much  different  from  the  figures  of  industry-financed  GERD:  in  the  group  of 
countries of the early technological frontier only the UK and France finished the period 
with a BERD/GDP lower than OECD average (figure A4, in Appendix); in the follower 
countries all the ones that fail in filing the GERD gap, finished the period of analysis 
with a BERD/GDP below the OECD average level (figure A5); in contrast countries 
that  succeeded  in  filing  the  GERD  gap  (only  with  the  Austrian  exception)  show  a 
significant increase in BERD/GDP (figure A6, in Appendix). 
From the above analysis, a 1
st conclusion can be drawn. Countries that have 
succeeded in catching the efforts in GERD/GDP coincide with those where industry 
financed  GERD  has  consistently  increased,  and  are  also  the  ones  that  improved 
significantly the BERD/GDP ratio. However, the previous analysis only considers the 
input side the R&D activities: the financial resources used with alleged R&D purposes. 
So, because R&D numbers may be overestimating the real growth in inventive input, a 
more accurate analysis makes the use of other indicators mandatory. In this respect, 
indicators that permit to assess the efficiency with whicu R&D expenditures are spent 
are particularly useful. Respecting the business sector the most obvious indicator for 





A patent is a document, supplied by a certified governmental agency, granting 
the  right  to  exclude  anyone  else  from  producing  or trading a  specific  new  product, 
device,  or  process  for  a  stated  number  of  years
3.  The  settled  purpose  of  the  patent 
system is to encourage invention and technical progress both by providing a temporary 
                                                 
3  Patent  statistics  are  used  with  various  functions.  For  the  functions  of  patent  counts  as  economic 
indicators, as well as for the difficulties that arise in their use and interpretation, see Griliches (1990).   11
monopoly  for  the  inventor  and  by  forcing  the  early  disclosure  of  the  information 
necessary  for  the  production  of  the  patented  item  or  for  the  operation  of  the  new 
process. From the endogenous growth viewpoint this latter reason is essential, because 
the immediate availability of knowledge is a condition for the continuous role of the engine 
of growth
4.  
Patents  are  the  measure  of  the  output  of  research  that  better  represents  the 
capacity  for  using  inventions  with  economic  purposes.  In  effect,  a  patent  does 
correspond  to  a  minimal  amount  of  invention  that  has  passed  both  the  trial  of  the 
investment of effort and resources by the inventor and his institute or firm into the 
development of this idea, product or process, and the examination of the patent office. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  patent  is  only  granted  if  four  conditions  are  simultaneously 
fulfilled:  i)  industrial  applicability  —  the  invention  must  be  of  practical  use;  ii) 
inventive step — the invention must not be merely deduced by a person with average 
knowledge of the technical field; iii) novelty, that is, the invention must show some new 
characteristic which is not known in the bulk of existing knowledge in its technical 
field; iv) the subject of invention must be accepted as "patentable" under country’s law
5.  
In general, an application for a patent must be filed, and a patent shall be granted 
and enforced, in each country in which one looks for patent protection for its invention, 
in accordance with the law of that country. Although in some regions, a regional patent 
office (for example, the European Patent Office or the African Regional Intellectual 
Property Organization) accepts regional patent applications, or grants patents, which 
have the same effect as applications filed, or patents granted, in the member states of 
that region, the patent system has a national basis. 
The granting rate of patents (which ultimately shows the stringency of patent 
office examination) varies greatly across countries. As was demonstrated by Griliches 
(1990),  this  variability  is  largely  associated  with  differences  in  the  procedures  and 
resources  of  the  various  patent  offices,  implying  therefore  also  differences  in  the 
average “quality” of a granted patent across countries and along time.  
                                                 
4 All patent owners are obliged, in return for patent protection, to publicly reveal information on their 
invention in order to improve the world bulk of technical knowledge. Such a growing body of public 
knowledge promotes further creativity and innovation in others. In this way, patents provide not only 
protection for the owner but valuable information and inspiration for future generations of researchers and 
inventors. 
5 In many countries, scientific theories, mathematical methods, plant or animal varieties, discoveries of 
natural substances, commercial methods, or methods for medical treatment (rather than medical products) 
are not patentable.   12
So, if we intend to evaluate the inventiveness of various countries through patent 
counts we must use figures generated by the same criteria for the analysed sample of 
countries. This necessity of comparativeness implies using patent counts granted in the 
same reference country. In this paper we’ll use figures of patents granted in the USA by 
USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office). Figure 7 shows the number of 
utility patents (i. e., patents of invention) granted to residents in the US and to residents 
in all the other countries around the world, from 1963 to 2004.  
 
Figure 7 











Source: Based on data from USPTO (2006). 
 
As it is apparent from the figure, the evolution of the number of patents along 
time  was  not  linear.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  an  important  discrepancy  in  the 
evolution of the number of patents according to the origin of inventors: for instance, the 
convergence between foreign origin and US origin, particularly visible from 1966, is 
interrupted  around  the  end  of  the  1980’s.  This  stoppage  in  the  patent  counts 
convergence anticipates the interruption of the European catching up process initiated 
after the 2
nd world war.  
Table 1 shows the results of the simple regression of the annual change in Gross 
Domestic Product (measured in million current PPP$) and the numbers of US patents 
for a panel of countries separated in two samples: a large sample compounded by all the 
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GDP change and patent counts, 1982-2004 
Large sample  Restricted sample 
Pooled LS  GLS 
cross section weights  Pooled LS 
GLS 
cross section weights 
 




























































































2 R   0.50  0.89  0.50  0.89  0.81  0.91  0.79  0.90 
Source: Calculations based on OECD (2005). 
Notes: t tests are shown in brackets: *significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent 
level; Standard errors and covariance matrix are White (1980) heteroskedastic corrected. 
 
In table 1 we show the estimates calculated by two different methods and for two 
time lags: we regress the change in GDP on the number of patents of one and two years 
before. Columns 1, 1’, 3 and 3’ show estimates that are obtained by Pooled OLS. This 
specification  estimates  the  model  using  system  OLS  method,  and  has  implicit  the 
verification of the assumptions of the classic linear regression model. So, it is only 
appropriate when the residuals are contemporaneously uncorrelated and time period and 
cross-section  homoskedastic.  But  because  when  the  residuals  are  cross-section 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously uncorrelated it is more appropriate to use cross-
section weights, the table reports GLS estimates, too (columns 2, 2’, 4 and 4’)
7. The 
first of each pair of columns presents estimates with a common constant; the second 
presents estimates obtained by a fixed effects model. 
As is apparent from the table there is a strong relationship between the change in 
GDP and the number of patents received across countries and along time, as the usual 
                                                 
6 For a different approach of the use of patents in testing ideas-driven models, see Pessoa (2005). 
7 We have also calculated Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimates (Zellner, 1962). SUR is the 
feasible GLS estimator when the residuals are both cross-section heteroskedastic and contemporaneously 
correlated. The results, not very different from the reported in table 1, are available from the authors upon 
request.   14
criteria for assessing the statistical significance show: 
2 R  typically high, and high levels 
of significance measured by the t tests. However, the number of patents also depends on 
the level of development of the country as it is shown in figure 8, where the number of 
US patents per million inhabitants is depicted as a function of the level of development.  
 
Figure 8 













Source: Based on data from OECD (2005) and World Bank (2006). 
 
Figure 8 shows an image similar to the depicted in figure 1, where the association 
between GERD and GDP per capita is represented: a non linear relationship between 
the variables. However, in contrast with the GERD behaviour the dispersion around the 
expected value is much concentrated in the high levels of development. On the one 
hand, Norway and Ireland show patent counts evidently poorer than expected given 
their level of development. One the other hand other countries, like Japan and Finland, 
had patent counts clearly greater than it would be expectable owing to their level of 
GDP per capita. 
Countries  that  significantly  increased  GERD/GDP  (Finland,  Iceland,  Denmark, 
Austria and Belgium) are countries that have already a considerable number of patents 
per million inhabitants (from 17.3 in Iceland to 39.8 in Finland) in 1981. Furthermore, 
these countries, excepting Iceland, have experienced an annual average growth rate of 
the number of US patents higher than the world average, from 1963 to 1980: Denmark 
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II, almost all the countries that have benefited from long periods of economic sustained 
growth have also experienced high growth rates of patents.  
Table 2 presents the annual average growth rates of US patents from 1981 to 
2002, and the number of US patents per million inhabitants in 2002, in a sample of 36 
countries. Table 2 shows that the highest growth rates of patent counts correspond to 
countries  which  we  can  include  in  one  of  two  situations:  either  countries  that  have 
significantly increased the GERD/GDP ratio (Iceland, Finland), or countries that have 
previously initiated a practice of relying on patents as a mechanism of technological 
change (Korea, Singapore). China, at the top of the list, fulfils, both criteria.  
 
Table 2  
Average growth rate of US patents 
US patents per million inhabitants 
Country  Growth*  Value**   Country  Growth*  Value** Country  Growth*  Value** 
China  23.19 0.53 Argentina  5.14 1.54 Germany  3.60 175.49 
Korea, Rep.  21.53 106.53 Japan  5.02 323.31 Poland  3.15 0.78 
Singapore  20.45 123.20 Norway  4.96 66.77 Austria  3.13 76.37 
Ireland  9.09 56.23 Denmark  4.88 86.90 U. Kingdom  3.07 81.56 
Iceland  8.18 100.69 Australia  4.71 63.67 Netherlands  3.01 100.90 
Turkey  7.89 0.33 U. States  4.43 426.53 France  2.94 78.74 
Finland  7.59 232.54 N. Zealand  4.06 37.57 Switzerland  1.08 224.83 
Israel  6.84 194.94 Greece  4.05 1.82 Russian Fed.  0.95 1.28 
Portugal  6.13 1.45 Sweden  3.79 193.75 South Africa  0.76 3.53 
Spain  5.97 7.97 Italy  3.79 34.74 Luxembourg  0.30 94.70 
Canada  5.27 148.56 Romania  3.76 0.28 Czech Rep.  -0.01 3.92 
Belgium  5.23 71.13 Mexico  3.63 1.10 Hungary  -2.95 5.32 
Source: Computation based on data from OECD (2005) 
Notes: * Annual average growth rate, 1981-2002; ** US patents per million inhabitants, 2002.  
 
As it is apparent from table 2 (and from other figures below), Asia presents the 
highest rates of growth of US patents, but in some Asian countries the level of US 
patents per million inhabitants is still very small, and in some of them (v. g., China) the 
efficiency of BERD is also very low. However, if these countries (China, Malaysia, 
Thailand and India) follow the path of other Asian countries (South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong-Kong and Singapore), as figure 10 seems to indicate, we’ll subsequently have 
new waves of Asian Tigers. 
  Figure 9 shows the most significant cases of growth of US patents per million 
inhabitants,  from  1981  to  2002.  Of  course,  there  are  other  economies  with  higher 
growth rates of patent counts (v. g., China, Turkey, Portugal) that the figure doesn’t 
consider. The main reason for this exclusion lies in their very small level of patents per   16
million  inhabitants,  which  is  insufficient  to  constitute  a  ground  for  cumulativeness, 
according to the models of knowledge-driven growth. However a high growth rate of 
patents, if sustained, is an important indicator of a potential technological and economic 
change in the near future, as was demonstrated with the first generation of Asian Tigers 
(Hong-Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore). Additionally, if patent counts can 
be taken as an indicator of the number of economically useful ideas, their high rate of 
growth is critical. According to the models of knowledge-driven growth (Romer, 1990; 
Jones, 1995), in order to have growth, the number of new ideas must grow over time. 
 
Figure 9 










Source: Based on data from OECD (2005) and World Bank (2006) 
 
Although the database we have used (OECD, 2005) do not supply enough R&D 
data about Singapore and South Korea for the entire period, the scarce data supplied 
show that these countries experienced a different path in what respects to GERD/GDP, 
industry-financed GERD and BERD/GDP. While Korea has experienced a path similar 
to the Finish one in all the above features, in Singapore none of those indicators grew 
sufficiently in order to catch the OECD average, in spite of the significant progress 




































































































































4. Efficiency of BERD 
 
In the preceding sections we have dealt with indicators of the effort of society as a 
whole and of firms to conduct R&D, as well as with a potential indicator of the success 
of those efforts: the number of patents received. However, countries may be more or 
less  successful in  the accomplishment of those efforts. So, another important aspect 
must be considered: The efficiency with which R&D outlays are spent. For the business 
sector it matters to know the ratio between US patent counts and BERD 
Table  3  presents  the  annual  average  in  the  period  1981-2002  of  the  ratio 
between US patent counts and BERD (measured in million 2000 dollars — constant 
prices  and  PPP)  for  the  unrestricted  sample  of  OECD  (2005).  There  is  roughly  a 
positive relationship between the efficiency of BERD and the level of development. 
This  is  partly  a  consequence  of  the  increasing  returns  associated  to  BERD,  as  was 
argued elsewhere (Pessoa and Silva, 2001). However, there is some national specificity 
that may influence the technological and economic performance of the countries and 
that partly outweighs some differences in R&D, as measured by the statistical indicators 
like GERD or BERD.  
 
Table 3 
US patents per million dollars BERD 
Country  Ratio  Country  Ratio  Country  Ratio 
Taiwan  0.877  Austria  0.301  Greece  0.103 
United States  0.470  Netherlands  0.298  Slovenia  0.078 
Iceland  0.466  Sweden  0.275  Spain  0.077 
Japan  0.465  Denmark  0.260  Portugal  0.041 
New Zealand  0.445  Ireland  0.221  Czech Republic  0.029 
Canada  0.412  U. Kingdom  0.202  Poland  0.027 
Switzerland  0.387  France  0.197  Russian Federation  0.027 
Finland  0.351  Italy  0.194  Slovak Republic  0.020 
Korea, Rep.  0.327  Belgium  0.180  Turkey  0.014 
Singapore  0.325  Mexico  0.174  China  0.013 
Israel  0.319  Norway  0.169  Romania  0.012 
Germany  0.319  Hungary  0.139     
Australia  0.317  Argentina  0.113     
Source: Calculations based on OECD (2005). 
 
Before  concluding  we  must  say  something  about  the  relationship  between 
productivity and technological change. The link between technology and productivity is 
not so evident as the commitments referred to in the introduction seem to believe. First,   18
not all productivity growth is due to inventions or other improvements in technology, 
and when it happens the effects of an invention on productivity appear with a long and 
variable  lag. In  this  case,  it is  doubtful  if  the available  econometric procedures  can 
identify all of them with accuracy. Moreover the aggregation of many lag structures is 
likely to level them out further, beyond any detection. Second, apart from technology, 
many  other  factors  have  an  impact  on  productivity:  for  instance,  the  growth  in  the 
quality of the labour force, the benefits from economies of scale and the reallocation of 
capital among industries, to name the most usually mentioned. 
However, a stylised fact can be drawn from the comparison between the growth 
of productivity and the growth US patents, as is shown in figure 10, which extends the 
number of countries used in the OECD database (OECD, 2005) using data from World 
Bank (2006) and the database of USPTO (2006).  
 
Figure 10. 












Source: Based on data from World Bank (2006) and USPTO (2006). 
Notes: The rates depicted are deviations from world average rates. 
 
Each one of the points in Figure 10 identifies one of 54 countries, each being 
represented by the deviation from the world average growth rate of both GDP pc and 
number of US patents. As it is apparent from the figure, the countries that experienced 
the highest rates of US patents are simultaneously the ones that show the highest rates 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
R&D expenditures typically constitute, for advanced economies, only a small 
percent of GDP. In a standard growth accounting framework, variations in the research 
effort  will,  therefore,  explain  very  little  of  the  differences  in  growth  rates  between 
countries. But the point of much of the new growth theory is precisely that if knowledge 
spillovers  are  substantial,  and  if  knowledge  exhibits  dynamic  feedback  effects,  then 
even small changes in the resources devoted to the production of knowledge may result 
in substantial changes in economic growth. 
In  this  paper  we  have  investigated  the  patterns  of  development  in  national 
innovative capacity, in a broad sample of countries that have included the leaders and 
the followers in catching up to the world's leading countries focusing on several types of 
indicators  at  country  level:  GERD/GDP,  BERD/GDP,  industry-financed  GERD  and 
patent  counts.  The  analysis  carried  out  has  allowed  us  to  put  forth  three  main 
conclusions that could be extensive to the growth of sub-national regions:  
i)  The most successful economies are those where increases in aggregate 
R&D efforts are induced by the action of the business sector;  
ii)  R&D efforts must go hand in hand with concerns of efficiency;  
iii)  High  growth  rates  of  patent  counts  are  closely  associated  to  high 
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Appendix 
 









Source: Based on data from OECD (2005). 
 
Figure A2. Industry financed GERD in well succeed followers 
Source: Based on data from OECD (2005). 
 
























































































































































Source: Based on data from OECD (2005). 
 











Source: Based on data from OECD (2005). 
 










Source: Based on data from OECD (2005). 
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